


# **GPS and Galileo Signal Authentication Using Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) Signal**

United Nations/Finland Workshop on  
the Applications of Global Navigation Satellite Systems

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# Spoofing Problems




# How to Detect / Protect Spoofing Attacks?

Hardware Level	RF Level	Signal Monitoring	Signal Encryption	Navigation Message Authentication
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Multi Antenna</li> <li>➤ Direction of Arrival</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ AGC Monitoring</li> <li>➤ RF Fingerprint</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ P-Code Reference</li> <li>➤ RAIM or ARAIM</li> <li>➤ Signal Sanity Check</li> <li>➤ Multi-Correlator</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ PRN Code Encryption</li> <li>➤ NAV Message Encryption</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Broadcast Digital Signature of NAV Message</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Impact on Receiver Hardware</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ FW/SW Modification</li> <li>➤ Little Impact on Hardware</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ FW/SW Modification</li> </ul>	
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ No PVT Solution until Decryption</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ PVT Solution available even if Authentication is not performed</li> </ul>
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Fully Backward Compatible</li> <li>➤ Possible to Implement on Existing Signals</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Fully Backward Compatible</li> <li>➤ Possible to Implement on Existing Signals</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Spoofing attacks may be identified but difficult to verify</li> <li>➤ Authentication is not possible</li> </ul>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Spoofing attacks can be detected and verified</li> <li>➤ Authentication is possible</li> </ul>	

# Current Status on Signal Authentication

Galileo OS NMA

- Authentication of OS E1b (I/NAV)
- Navigation Data Authentication
- Based on NMA using TESLA




Galileo OS NMA

QZSS SAS  
(Signal  
Authentication  
Service)

- Authentication of
  - QZSS L1C/A/B (LNAV)
  - QZSS L1C (CNAV-2)
  - QZSS L5 (CNAV)
  - GPS L1C/A (LNAV)
  - GPS L1C (CNAV-2)
  - GPS L5 (CNAV)
  - Galileo E1b (I/NAV)
  - Galileo E5a (F/NAV)
- Navigation Data Authentication
- Based on NMA, Digital Signature Verification

[https://gssc.esa.int/navipedia/index.php/Galileo\\_Open\\_Service\\_Navigation\\_Message\\_Authentication](https://gssc.esa.int/navipedia/index.php/Galileo_Open_Service_Navigation_Message_Authentication)



QZSS SAS


# QZSS Signal Authentication Service (QZSS-SAS)

- QZSS authenticates QZSS using QZSS Navigation Messages (LNAV, CNAV, CNAV-2)
- QZSS authenticates both GPS and Galileo using QZSS L6E Message

Signal used for Authentication	Signals to be Authenticated			Remarks
QZSS LNAV, CNAV, CNAV-2	QZSS LNAV, CNAV, CNAV-2	NA	NA	Self- Authentication
QZSS L6E	NA	GPS LNAV, CNAV, CNAV-2	NA	Cross- Authentication
	NA	NA	Galileo I/NAV, F/NAV	


# QZSS Signal Authentication by QZSS

- NMA (Navigation Message Authentication) based Signal Authentication.
- Broadcast Digital Signature of QZSS Navigation Message using one of the Navigation Messages of the Signal.




# GPS and Galileo Signal Authentication by QZSS

- NMA (Navigation Message Authentication) based Signal Authentication.
- Broadcast Digital Signature of GPS and Galileo Navigation Message using QZSS L6E Signal.



# QZSS SAS Schedule



# QZSS SAS IS Document


Refer QZSS SIS IS document for technical details on QZSS signal authentication  
<https://qzss.go.jp/en/technical/ps-is-qzss/ps-is-qzss.html>

	Performance Standard (PDF)	Interface Specification (PDF)	Service Performance Evaluation	Quasi-Zenith Satellite System Interface Specification Signal Authentication Service (IS-QZSS-SAS-001) Draft-002  (January 24 2023)  Cabinet Office	3 Signal Authentication Services  QZSS provides signal authentication services for QZSS L1C/A, L1C/B, L1C and L5 signals. It is done by transmitting Navigation Message Authentication (NMA) data embedded into the navigation messages of the respective QZSS signals. A NMA data is a portion of digital signature computed from the navigation message of a signal that has to be authenticated. For example, if QZSS L1C/A signal has to be authenticated, sub-frames 1, 2 and 3 of L1C/A signal are used to compute a digital signature. This digital signature is then reformatte to insert in Sub-frame 5. The satellite broadcasts this signal with NMA data in sub-frame 5. Table 3-1 shows the list of QZSS signals that is used to authenticate the respective QZSS signals. QZSS L1C/A signal is used to authenticate L1C/A signal. Similarly, L1C signal is used to authenticate L1C signal and L5 signal is used to authenticate L5 signal.  QZSS also provides signal authentication services for GPS L1C/A, L1C, L5 signals and Galileo E1B and ESa signals. It is done by transmitting NMA data embedded into the navigation messages of QZSS L6E signal to authenticate GPS and GALILEO signals. Table 3-2 shows the list of GPS and Galileo signals that is authenticated by using QZSS L6E signal.
Satellite Positioning, Navigation and Timing Service		IS-QZSS-PNT-004 (Jan. 25, 2021 / 2.3MB)	Satellite Positioning, Navigation and Timing Service		
Sub-meter Level Augmentation Service (SLAS)		IS-QZSS-PNT-005 (Oct. 24, 2022 / 3.9MB)(**)	Sub-meter Level Augmentation Service (SLAS)		
Centimeter Level Augmentation Service (CLAS)	PS-QZSS-003 (Mar.17, 2022 / 1.1MB)(*)	IS-QZSS-L1S-005 (Feb. 3, 2023 / 1.0MB)	Centimeter Level Augmentation Service (CLAS)		
Satellite Report for Disaster and Crisis Management (DC Report)		IS-QZSS-L6-005 (Sep. 21, 2021 / 1.4MB)	Centimeter Level Augmentation Service (CLAS)		
Positioning Technology Verification Service		IS-QZSS-DCR-010 (Jan. 24, 2022 / 4.5MB)	-		
MADODCA-PPP		IS-QZSS-TV-003 (Dec. 27, 2019 / 0.9MB)	-		
Signal Authentication Service		IS-QZSS-MDC-001 (Feb. 28, 2022 / 3.3MB)	MADODCA-PPP		
		IS-QZSS-SAS-001_Draft-002 (Jan. 24, 2023 / 2.7MB)	-		


SV ID	QZSS Signals with QZSS Navigation Message Authentication				Satellite Orbit Type	Comments
	PRN ID	Signal	Signal	Signal		
QZS01	193	L1C/A	L1C	L5	QZO	Eligible if operational
QZS02	194	L1C/A	L1C	L5	QZO	
QZS04	195	L1C/A	L1C	L5	QZO	
QZS1R	196	L1C/A	L1C	L5	QZO	Switching from L1C/A to L1C/B in the future
	203	L1C/B	-	-	QZO	
	197	L1C/A	L1C	L5	QZO	Switching from L1C/A to L1C/B in the future
QZS05	204	L1C/B	-	-	QZO	
QZS03	199	L1C/A	L1C	L5	GEO	
QZS06	200	L1C/A	L1C	L5	GEO	Switching from L1C/A to L1C/B in the future
	205	L1C/B	-	-	GEO	
	201	L1C/A	L1C	L5	(Q)GEO	Switching from L1C/A to L1C/B in the future
QZS07	206	L1C/B	-	-	(Q)GEO	

SV ID	QZSS L6E Signal with GPS and Galileo Navigation Message Authentication			Satellite Orbit Type	Comments
	PRN ID	Signal	GNSS Navigation Message		
QZS01	203	-	-	QZO	
QZS02	204	L6E	-	QZO	
QZS04	205	L6E	GPS LNAV	QZO	
QZS1R	206	L6E	GPS CNAV	QZO	
QZS05	207	L6E	GPS CNAV2	QZO	
QZS03	209	L6E	Galileo I/NAV	QGEO	
QZS06	210	L6E	Galileo F/NAV	QGEO	
QZS07	211	L6E	-	QGEO	


# QZSS Signal Authentication of GPS and Galileo: Tokyo Test Results




# QZSS Signal Authentication of GPS and Galileo: Jakarta Test Results



# QZSS Signal Authentication of GPS and Galileo: Kathmandu Test Results



# QZSS Signal Authentication of GPS and Galileo: Helsinki Test Results




## Summary and Future Works

- Authentication of GPS and Galileo signals is done successfully
- The following KPIs (Key Performance Indicators) will be conducted in the near future
  - TTFA (Time To First Authentication)
  - TBA ( Time Between Authentication)
  - AER (Authentication Error Rate)
- Authentication tests will be conducted using different types of receivers
- Any receiver that outputs navigation data bits is authentication compatible

# Reference Slides: QZSS SAS IS Document Slides

# QZSS Signal Authentication System



NMA : Navigation Message Authentication

DS : Digital Signature


ECDSA : Elliptical Curve Digital Signature Authentication

NAV : Navigation

QMS : QZSS Monitoring Station

RAND : Reference Authentication Navigation Data

# GNSS Signal Authentication System



AMS : Authentication Monitoring Station

NMA : Navigation Message Authentication

DS : Digital Signature

ECDSA : Elliptical Curve Digital Signature Authentication

NAV : Navigation


RAND : Reference Authentication Navigation Data

QMS : QZSS Monitoring Station


# GPS Signal Authentication Overview, GPS L1C/A, LNAV

RNAV : Reference Navigation Message  
 MASK : Mask Data  
 MNAV : Mask Navigation Message  
 RAND : Reference Authentication Navigation Data  
 HASH : Hash Message Digest  
 DS : Digital Signature  
 RDS : Reformat Digital Signature  
 DSS : Digital Signature Segment  
 NMAF : Navigation Message Format  
 QZNMA : QZSS Navigation Message Authentication


 “AND” Operation



# GPS Signal Authentication Overview, Signal: GPS L1C/A, Message: LNAV



# GPS LNAV : Mask Navigation Message (MASK)




⊗ “AND” Operation

RNAV : Reference Navigation Message

MASK : Mask Data

MNAV : Mask Navigation Message

# GPS LNAV: Reference Authentication Navigation Data (RAND)




RAND : Reference Authentication Navigation Data

RTOW : Reference Time Of Week

MNAV : Mask Navigation Message

# GPS LNAV: Reformat Digital Signature (RDS)




RDS : Reformat Digital Signature

RTOW : Reference Time of Week

DS : Digital Signature

# GPS LNAV: L6E Navigation Message Authentication Frame (NMAF)



NMAF : Navigation Message Authentication Frame

RDS : Reformat Digital Signature

RS Code : Reed-Solomon Code